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THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW. By DAVID A.J. RICHARDS.
Dickenson Publishing Co., 1977. Pp. ix, 278. Price $6.95
paperbound.**
Professor Richards' theory of constitutional adjudication may
be put in bold relief by juxtaposing it to the famous remarks of
Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York.' Confronted with
the Court's invalidation of legislation establishing maximum working hours in bakeries, Holmes complained: "[t]his case is decided
upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain. .

.

.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.

Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 2 No doubt this is true, Richards
would reply, but the Constitution does enact social contract theory,
and this justifies interpreting it in terms of that theory and its contemporary refinements by John Rawls and himself. "Contractarian
theory does not beckon as a theoretical desideratum extraneous tothe constitutional order; it is at its foundation. The choice of this
moral theory is not an open question in the United States; it is the
theory of the Constitution and, as such, requires the most serious
analysis." 3
That Richards should be championing contractarian theory is,
of course, no surprise. His previous work has been explicit and
sophisticated in its defense of a Rawlsian approach to moral theory
generally and to legal analysis specifically. 4 Indeed, a significant
portion of this new book is a consolidation of his articles in "the
context of a larger theoretical framework." 5 What may come as a
certain surprise is the format in which this contribution to constitu*Written by Thomas R. Andrews, second year law student at the University
of Pennsylvania and Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at Northwestern University.
00 Currently distributed by Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., Belmont, California.
1198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2Id. 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3D.A.J. RicHaans, THE MoRAL CRITiCIsM oF LAw 51 (1977) (footnote
omitted).
4 See D.A.J. BicnArns, A TnEoRY OF REASONS FOR Ac' ONS (1971); Richards,
Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 Form1Am L. REv. 1281 (1977); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a
Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974); Richards,
Equal Opportunity and School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional
Adjudication, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 32 (1973).
GD.A.J. Ric-ARns, supra note 3, at vii.
(1447)
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tional theory comes. The book is intended as an introduction to
the philosophy of law, and for use in conjunction with a well-known
anthology in the field.6 Whatever its avowed purpose, however, it
deserves the attention of any who feel the need for a coherent set of
principles of constitutional adjudication in American law.
At the outset, it may be helpful to describe briefly the structure
of the book. Following a review of the traditional jurisprudence of
the concept of law and the relationship between law and morality,
Richards adopts the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and gives a
brief but effective defense of Hart's position against such would-be
critics as Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin.7 He then sets out the
theoretical framework with which he will attack specific legal problems. First, he adopts what he calls "methodological natural law
theory." 8 I shall return to this theory shortly, for it is the crucial
move in the book.9 On the basis of this methodology, Richards
reviews recent American constitutional theory 10 and concludes, with
Dworkin, that it fails to recognize the importance of a notion of
moral rights in any adequate theory of constitutional adjudication.:1
In order to fill this gap, he proceeds to elaborate a contractarian
theory of rights by setting up the Rawlsian "original position" and
deriving two basic principles of justice. 1 2 Space does not permit
discussion of this controversial feature of Rawls' social contract
theory; it must suffice to state the principles that Richards believes
would be reached through its use. Their similarity to Rawls' principles will be apparent to anyone familiar with his work: 13
The principle of equal liberty and basic opportunity
Basic institutions are to be arranged so that every person
in the institution is guaranteed the greatest equal liberty
and basic opportunity compatible with a like liberty and
basic opportunity for all.
61d. vi.
1d. 23-31.

81d. 31-33.
9 See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
10 This review of constitutional theory is extremely cursory.

A more recent

and thorough discussion of modem theories may be found in Richards, Rules,
Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 11 GA. L. Rlv. 1069 (1977).

11 D.A.J. RicaAsDs, supra note 3, at 40-44.
12The Rawlsian device asks us to imagine hypothetical rational contractors,
ignorant of their special circumstances but knowledgeable about their general circumstances, choosing principles of justice for social institutions.
13 See J. RAwLs, A THEoRY OF JusTicE 60, 302-03 (1971).
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The principle of justified inequality
Inequalities in the distribution by institutions of general
goods like money, property, and status are to be allowed
only if those inequalities are a necessary incentive to elicit
the exercise of superior capacities and only if the exercise
of those capacities advances the interests of typical people
in all standard classes in the institution more than equality
would advance those interests and makes the life expectation of desire satisfaction of the typical person in the leastadvantaged class as high as possible. 14
Having derived these principles, Richards then brings them to
bear on a variety of constitutional problems and Supreme Court
decisions. First he urges that his principle of equal liberty requires
the protection of obscene communications under the first amendment. 5 He then derives a third principle from the original position, that of "love as a civil liberty," 16 which he uses to justify the
recent promulgation of a constitutional right to privacy and to
recommend an analogous recognition of the equal rights of homosexuals.' 7 Following discussion of these Bill of Rights questions,
Richards plunges into the equal protection thicket. He argues that
equal educational opportunity follows from his first principle and
that, accordingly, the school financing schemes upheld by the
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez Is should have been subjected to strict scrutiny and in20
validated.' 9 He reaches a similar result as to gender classifications,
but argues that preferential racial classifications designed to remedy
past discrimination are not suspect. 21
Turning from equal protection, Richards next applies his contractarian theory to problems of responsibility and punishment. He
argues that the "principle of legality" 22 ("no crime or punishment'
except in accordance with fixed, reasonably specific, and fairly ascertainable preestablished law"), mens rea2 3 (at least negligence), actus
14 D.A.J.

EicHARDs,

supra note 3, at 48-49.

15 Id. 56-79.
16 Id. 90. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
'7 Id. 91-109.
18411 U.S. 1 (1973).
19 D.AJ. RrcAnns, supra note 3, at 138-61.
20 Id. 162-67, 173-78.
211d. 170-72.
22 Id. 195-99.
23 Id. 206-09.
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reus2 4 (including attempts), and the insanity defense 25 should all be
viewed as constitutional requirements flowing from his first principle. Laws providing for the commitment of the mentally ill
should also be subject to strict scrutiny, and persons committed
should be acknowledged to have a constitutional right to treatment. 2
He then briefly discusses the appropriateness of enforcing a duty of
mutual aid through good samaritan laws. 27 Finally, Richards develops from his contractarian principles a "moral theory of punishment." Here he adds to the requirements derived under the rubric
of responsibility several additional requirements for just punishment. Punishment "must reflect the moral gravity of offenses
punished" 28 (proportionality); it must be of such a nature as to
deter criminal behavior; 29 and "the upper level of penal sanctions
is to be governed by one final principle of punishment, a principle
of effectiveness and economy in sanctions." 30 Although the death
penalty is neither condemned nor required by contractarian theory
in the abstract, Richards concludes that, on the basis of present
empirical evidence, it fails to satisfy the principle of effe6tiveness
31
and economy, and is consequently unconstitutional.
All of this is an impressive philosophical tour de force. The
synopsis presented above cannot hope to capture either the seriousness or the subtlety of Richards' arguments on any of these topics;
each deserves more careful evaluation than can be set forth here.
A few general observations, however, are in order. First, it should
not be inferred that Richards claims any particular originality for
many of his distinctions and insights. He copiously documents his
sources in a way that demonstrates the richness and diversity of the
literature from which he draws. What is original is the particular
manner in which he integrates law and philosophy. Second, the
book's discussions are uneven, both in the breadth of the problems
discussed and in the thoroughness with which each problem is
treated. They range, for example, from the fairly specific problem
of school financing to the very general problem of just principles of
punishment, and while some twenty-three pages are devoted to the
24
25

Id. 201-02.
Id. 214-16.

26 Id. 216-20.

Id. 221-24.
28 Id. 243.
27

29

Id. 244.

30 Id.
31

Id. 254-59.
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discussion of school financing 22 only six are devoted to the problem
of preferential treatment. 33 Third, despite the wide range of problems covered in the book, a conspicuous omission is evident when
one returns to Richards' two basic principles of justice. The second
principle, it will be recalled, is one of justifiable inequalities. Yet
with one minor exception in the discussion of punishment, all of
Richards' analyses derive from the first principle. This is hardly
surprising, as it is certainly philosophically easier to demonstrate
why certain traditionally victimized groups should be treated with
equal respect than it is to show which inequalities may justly remain.
But surely Richards does not intend to imply that the principle of
equal liberty will solve all problems of constitutional adjudication.
For example, notoriously difficult problems concerning the appropriate treatment of property under the fifth, fourteenth, and sixteenth amendments must presumably be governed by the principle
of justifiable inequality. Yet no consideration of these problems
appears in a book purporting to be a general introduction to the
moral criticism of American constitutional law. The omission, although not surprising, is regrettable. It creates the impression that
these problems are secondary and that all of the hardest problems
have been at least confronted, if not definitively resolved. More
seriously, we are left with little indication as to how Richards believes contractarian theory should proceed in applying the second
principle to constitutional adjudications involving the distribution
of wealth. 34
All that aside, perhaps the most interesting and puzzling feature
book is the methodology Richards adopts. As discussed
the
of
earlier, he embraces Hart's legal positivism, but then follows what
he terms a natural law methodology:
Methodological natural law theory, as I practice it in
this book, rests on this essentially empirical observation
that legal and moral concepts significantly interconnect in
concrete legal institutions of many kinds. Taking this empirical fact as a methodological postulate, this form of
32 Id. 138-61.
33 Id. 170-72, 176-78. The author does, however, refer the reader to vhat is
presumably a more complete discussion of this topic by the author in a forthcoming
anthology. See id. 190 n.167.
34 Richards does say that the judiciary is particularly competent to apply the

principle of equal liberty, "whereas the application of the principle of justified
inequality involves complex assessments of social and economic facts and theories
which should in general be left to legislatures." Id. 55. Unless he intends that
the legislature is to exercise carte blanche when property rights are at issue, this is
at best a suggestive beginning.
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natural law theory focuses on the examination of those
concrete legal institutions and issues that rest on moral
conceptions. 35
This, of course, is not especially novel. One would suppose that a
positivist such as H.L.A. Hart would accept this as a characterization
30
of what he was doing in his book Law, Liberty, and Morality.
What is novel is the departure that Richards believes he is making
from the approach that a positivist would take:
[Mjethodological natural law theory may be distinguished
from the traditional sharp legal positivist distinction between the popular conventional morality underlying many
laws and the enlightened (often utilitarian) morality in
terms of which laws were to be criticized and reformed.
Methodological natural law draws no such sharp distinction. Rather . . . the moral analysis, which often clarifies

is the same analysis which is the
the form of legal doctrine,
37
basis of moral criticism.

When it is realized that Richards adopts this methodology while
agreeing with legal positivism that, as a logical matter, there is no
necessary connection between law and morality, it should be clear
what he is positing: in some legal systems, that which need not
necessarily be true is nevertheless, for practical purposes, factually
or empirically true. This is the case, he argues, with American
constitutional law.
[T]o suppose some type of necessary relation between law
and morals in American legal experience is not implausible. In America we have written state and federal constitutions that literally incorporate substantive moral criteria
into the conditions of legal validity. For example, the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution speaks of "due
process of law" and "equal protection of the laws." 38
On the other hand, Richards' argument continues, there may not
always be such an intimate connection between moral concepts and
the law, and "where the task of moral criticism is facilitated by the
traditional legal positivist approach (as it may be in England, for
example), that approach should be preferred." 39
35 Id. 33.

36

H.L.A. HARTa, LAW, LmE1RY, AND MoALrY (1963).

37D.A.J. RlcauRDs, supra note 3, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
38 Id. 39.

39 id. 35.
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In order to justify abandoning the sharp positivist distinction
between conventional and critical morality, however, Richards needs
more than such general conceptions as "due process" and "equal
protection." Presumably it must also be the case that one's critical
moral standards generally coincide with those on which the legal
structure is founded-that is, with the conventional moral standards
that have been incorporated in the fundamental laws. This happy
coincidence, which Richards finds in American constitutional law,
accounts for the statement quoted at the beginning of this note to
the effect that social contract theory is no longer an open question
in American law. Elsewhere Richards states that he will "endeavor
here to present and explain a contractarian moral theory, showing
how this theory may explain the structural features of constitutional
law which remain inexplicable under available theories, and then
focusing this theory on concrete problems of constitutional adjudication." 40
The most obvious thing to be said about such a methodology
is that if social contract theory is not a satisfactory way to derive
objective principles of justice, then Richards' theory of constitutional
adjudication must also be unsatisfactory. His methodology depends
upon the agreement between the theory underlying the Constitution
and the critical moral theory of the commentator. But to the extent
that one believes, as does this reviewer, that Rawls has shown contractarian theory to be at least a constructive starting point,
Richards' methodology may be particularly helpful for students of
American constitutional law.
At the same time, Richards' legal analyses seem problematic for
at least two reasons, either as a necessary result of methodological
natural law theory or as a function of its too hasty employment.
First, Richards believes that under his methodology he can justify
the "discovery" of rights in the Constitution which it scarcely seems
plausible to argue are contained therein. Furthermore, the role
that Richards accords the judicial branch in drawing out the constitutional implications of contractarian theory fails to take account of
the complexity of the very Constitution for which the method is
designed.
These problems are nowhere as obvious as in Richards' treatment of the right to privacy. He argues that rational contractors
in the original position would adopt a "principle of love as a civil
liberty": Basic institutions are to be arranged so that every person
in the institution is guaranteed the greatest equal liberty, oppor40 Id. 44.

1454

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:1447

tunity, and capacity to love, compatible with a like liberty, opportunity, and capacity for all.41 Such a principle, he believes,
provides a moral justification for the privacy rights which were
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 42 and Roe v. Wade,43 as
well as for constitutional protection of homosexual relationships
44
between consenting adults.
It is not my purpose here to disagree with Richards' moral
analysis. Assuming that each of these forms of conduct deserves
legal protection at the constitutional level, however, it does not
necessarily follow that such protection is implicit in our Constitution; yet Richards argues as if it does. In effect, he accepts the
reasoning of Griswold.
The very intellectual process of the Court in first
enunciating the constitutional right of privacy illustrates
the kind of reasoning called for by contractarian principles.
Thus, Justice Douglas argues by analogy that various constitutional provisions preserve values similar to the constitutional right of privacy, and that accordingly that right
may be established as an independent value ...
These analogies may be stated in even more compelling fashion. While the Bill of Rights is not directly involved in the constitutional right of privacy cases, its
underlying values are implicit in the consideration of love
as a primary good, so that constitutional values require
that, in the light of modern knowledge, love be acknowledged as a constitutional right. 45
With all due respect to Mr. Justice Douglas, it must be admitted
that the similarity between the specific values protected by the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments and the rights to use
contraceptives and to have abortions is not immediately obvious.
Those constitutional values are even more distant from the right to
love argued for by Richards. The right to privacy was surely a
radical extension of the constitutional language, and not implicit
therein. Richards' argument that the Constitution will properly
yield even more radical extensions of the right to privacy requires
us to view the Constitution as a Rawlsian manifesto rather than as
a limited positive legal document. At the very least, this approach
41 Id. 90.

See text accompanying note 16 supra.

42381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43410 U.S. 113 (1973).

44D.A.J. RicHAnDs, supra note 3, at 106.
45 Id. 94 (footnote omitted).
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makes nonsense of the procedure for amending the Constitution.
One might suppose that Richards views that procedure as little more
than a safeguard against myopic judges rather than as the primary
mechanism for altering and enlarging the fundamental law.
This problem is addressed in the introductory part of the book,
but the author's comments are unsatisfying. The reader is asked
(following Dworkin) to distinguish between concepts and conceptions of justice, 46 the former being the ideal principles which would
be adopted from the original position, the latter, particular historical
ways of thinking about justice. We are then told that "[t]he argument thus can forcefully be made that the proper moral interpretation of the constitutional order would emphasize the concept of
justice embodied in the Constitution as developed by subsequent
amendments, not the historically limited conception of justice of
the country's founders." 47 But the conceptions of subsequent
amenders must also be historically limited, so it is difficult to understand why the proper moral interpretation does not require shaking
off their limitations, too. Yet in the very next paragraph Richards
tell us that "courts must observe the guidelines clearly established
by the constitutional texts," 48 and uses the state action requirement,
"however unjustifiable," to exemplify "a significant barrier to the
otherwise natural idea that constitutional provisions can be used to
attack all forms of political immorality." 49 The result is confusion.
On the one hand, we are urged to coax the ideal out of the real; on
the other, we are told that the real is to be our guide.
The problem is this: the crucial distinction here is that between
the ideal constitution which rational contractors would adopt and
that which not so ideal founding fathers and subsequent amenders
actually did adopt. Yet this is precisely the distinction between
critical moral principles and the conventional morality underlying
positive law which methodological natural law theory is concerned
to deny.50 To the extent that Richards acknowledges that the Constitution will not plausibly yield some of the protections required
by the principles of justice without open amendment, his methodology ceases to be a useful tool for constitutional adjudication.
A possible way to avoid this result for Richards' methodology
lies in an analysis of the relative institutional responsibilities which
are appropriately to be accorded to various branches of government
40 Id. 53.
47 Id.

48 Id.
49Id. 53-54.

GO See id. 33.
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on contractarian principles. If the moral theory were brought to
bear to indicate more clearly when the judiciary should exercise a
creative role and when it should defer to the amendment process, it
might be possible to retain the methodology as an approach to legal
reform generally. Thus, when the constitutional text will not yield
contractarian results through the proper exercise of the judicial
function, then resort would be had to amendment. Unfortunately,
Richards' only comments analyzing institutional responsibilities concern the relative roles of the judiciary and the legislature. He tells
us first that the judiciary is particularly competent to assess the
proper application of his first principle and the legislature to apply
the second.51 This is of no help, however, in arriving at the proper
limits of the judicial application of the first principle. He also tells
us that "[t]he point of view of contractarian theory in this context
is realistic and pragmatic: the competences of courts and legislatures
are to be adjusted so that on balance the requirements of justice
may most effectively be realized over time." 52 But even if we are
warranted in extending this to the choice between judicial alteration
and amendment, the comment is unilluminating;, precisely what is
being sought is a principled way of striking the proper balance.
In all fairness, Richiards does not claim to be doing more than
developing a theory of constitutional adjudication; indeed, his
claims even in this regard are modest. "[T]he discussions in this
work are exploratory in nature.

.

.

.

[W]hile they contain glim-

mers of some final truth in these matters, these views do not yet
articulate that truth in a finished or final way. The comprehensive
theory of moral values in constitutional law has yet to be written." 3
Furthermore, it is always easier to criticize than to do constructive
philosophical work. That this book needs to be supplemented does
not detract from its status as one of the most interesting and. original
pieces of constitutional theory written in the last decade.
51 Id. 54-55.

521d. 56.
53d Vii.

